University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2007

Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch
Relations
Stephen B. Burbank
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Repository Citation
Burbank, Stephen B., "Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch Relations" (2007).
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 98.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/98

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
Interbranch Relations
STEPHEN B. BURBANK*
ABSTRACT
In this Essay, I argue that the main cause of the poisonous state of interbranch
relations involving the federal judiciary, as of the frequent and strident attacks on
courts—federal and state—are strategies calculated to persuade the public that
courts are part of ordinary politics and thus that judges are policy agents to be held
accountable as such. Although unremarkable in the sense that a breakdown in norms
of interdependence is a defining characteristic of contemporary politics, I regard the
current situation involving the federal judiciary as remarkably dangerous because of
the possibility that a tipping point of no return to the traditional equilibrium in
interbranch relations may be reached. That prospect is suggested by the insight that
our “tradition of judicial independence” has depended critically on the public’s
support of the courts irrespective of the decisions they make (“diffuse support”), and
by research that provides reason to fear that the distinction between diffuse support
and support depending on those decisions (“specific support”) will disappear,
leading people to ask of the judiciary not, “What does the law require?,” but rather,
“What have you done for me lately?” I then turn to how, in the conduct of
interbranch relations, the judiciary should respond to the impulses and incentives,
both legitimate and illegitimate, that have brought us to this unhappy point. I
conclude that successful interbranch relations require the institutional judiciary to
avoid the attitudes and techniques of contemporary politics, but not to avoid politics,
and that the main challenge in that regard is to avoid the perception that the federal
judiciary is just another interest group. Finally, using the writings and career of the
late Richard Arnold to exemplify what is needed in the politics of judging as well as
the politics of the judiciary, I argue for judges to provide leadership in a return to
norms of custom, dialogue, and statesmanship in interbranch relations. In order to
do so, more federal judges will need to follow Arnold’s example in recognizing that a
presidential commission does not confer moral superiority; that judicial accountability, properly conceived, is essential for judicial independence; and that both “posterity worship” (the attempt to control the future) and institutional aggrandizement are
inimical to the long-term interests of the federal courts and the federal judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed attacks on the courts, federal and state, that have
been notable for both their frequency and their stridency.1 Many of these attacks
have been part of strategies calculated to create and sustain an impression of
judges that makes courts fodder for electoral politics. The strategies reflect a
theory of judicial agency, the idea that judges are a means to an end, and that it
is appropriate to pursue chosen ends through the selection of judges who are
committed or will commit to them in advance. The architects of these strategies
seek to create the impression not only that courts are part of the political system,
but also that they and the judges who sit upon them are part of ordinary politics.
At the federal level, pursuit of these strategies prompts politicians to curry
favor by promising to hold courts and judges accountable: staffing courts (or
ensuring that they are staffed) with reliable judges, monitoring them through
“oversight,” and, when they stray, reining them in through the instruments of
politics—ordinary or extraordinary (impeachment). At both the federal and state
levels, these strategies enable interest groups to wield influence by framing
judicial selection in terms of the supposed causal influence of a vote in favor of
or against a judicial nominee or candidate on results in high salience cases, such
as those involving the death penalty or abortion.
Proceeding from this view of the causes of our current malaise in interbranch
relations affecting the judiciary, I seek, in Part I, to make precise the nature and
extent of the threat that they pose to judicial independence. In Part II, I turn to
how, in the conduct of interbranch relations, the judiciary should respond to the
impulses and incentives, both legitimate and illegitimate, that have brought us
to this unhappy point in interbranch relations. The insight developed there—that

1. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 13, 57.
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successful interbranch relations require the institutional judiciary to avoid the
attitudes and techniques of contemporary politics, but not to avoid politics—
leads me finally to consider judicial politics more generally in Part III.
In pursuing these goals, I draw on (without frequent citation to) my interdisciplinary work exploring judicial independence and judicial accountability and
the implications for the future of theoretical and empirical research concerning
interest groups and public knowledge of and attitudes toward courts.2 I also
draw on editorials written during my tenure as Chair of the Editorial Committee
of the American Judicature Society and on work in which I have explored the
writings and career of a distinguished federal judge, the late Richard Sheppard
Arnold.3 This research illustrates the critical role that judicial accountability,
properly conceived, plays in judicial independence, and hence the critical role
that politics of a certain sort must play in the work of courts and the judiciary if
they are to continue to serve as the guardians of our fundamental rights and
liberties.4
I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE THREAT
In order to understand the relationship between judicial independence and
judicial accountability, and thereby gain the perspective necessary to evaluate
the state of the relationship portended by current developments, it is useful to
consider some of the fruits of recent interdisciplinary scholarship.
A. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Believing that discussions and debates about judicial independence had
produced more heat than light, and that scholars in different disciplines had
been talking past one another, in 2001, Barry Friedman and I convened a
conference of some thirty prominent academics with backgrounds spanning the
disciplines of law, economics, history, and political science to discuss what we
knew about judicial independence. In a chapter of the book that emerged from
the conference, and in a free-standing article, I sought to demonstrate that
judicial independence is merely the other side of the coin from judicial account-

2. For a more comprehensive presentation of some of my arguments, see JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002);
Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006) [hereinafter Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II]; Stephen B.
Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999); Stephen B.
Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003) [hereinafter
Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?].
3. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future: Precedent,
Politics and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19 (2005).
4. Although some of the landscape I survey includes both the federal and state judiciaries, I will
focus on interbranch relations involving the federal judiciary and Congress. General accounts of and
prescriptions about interbranch relations risk the weakness that often undermines general accounts of
and prescriptions about judicial independence and judicial accountability: they may mask particularities
of different institutional designs that reflect different social and political aspirations.
THE
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ability (that the two are not at war with each other but rather are complements);
that neither is an end in itself but rather a means to an end (or variety of ends);
that the relevant ends relate not primarily to individual judicial performance but
rather to the performance of courts and court systems; and that there is no one
ideal mix of independence and accountability but rather that the right mix
depends upon the goals of those responsible for institutional architecture with
respect to a particular court or court system.5
From these premises, one can derive a number of additional propositions that
may be helpful in considering the relationship between judicial independence
and judicial accountability and the role that interbranch relations plays in
maintaining the balance between them that a particular polity desires. First,
judicial accountability has as many roles to play as does judicial independence.
As a result, judicial accountability should serve to moderate what would
otherwise be unacceptable decisional independence (that is, decisions unchecked by law as generally understood or, in the case of inferior courts, by the
prospect or reality of appellate review). In addition, judicial accountability
should moderate other judicial behavior that is hostile to or inconsistent with the
ability of courts to achieve the role or roles envisioned for them in the particular
polity (for example, as to federal judges, “conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts”).6
Second, just as independence must be conceived in relation to other actors
(independence from whom or what?), so must accountability (accountability to
whom or what?). As a result, judicial accountability should run to the public,
including litigants whose disputes courts resolve, and who therefore have a
legitimate interest in court proceedings that are open to the public and in
judicial decisions that are accessible. Judicial accountability should also run to
the people’s representatives, who appropriate the funds for the judiciary and
whose laws the courts interpret and apply, and who therefore have a legitimate
interest in ensuring that the judiciary has been responsible in spending the
allotted funds and that, as interpreted and applied by the courts, public laws are
functioning as intended. Finally, judicial accountability should run to courts and
the judiciary as an institution, both because individual judicial independence
exists primarily for the benefit of institutional independence and because appropriate intrabranch accountability is essential if potentially inappropriate interbranch accountability is to be avoided.7 In each instance, proper regard for the

5. See Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2, at 9; Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial
Independence”?, supra note 2.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (Supp. III 2003).
7. See Editorial, Separation of Powers and Mutual Respect, 87 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (2004) (“[Rep.
Sensenbrenner] seems not to be aware, however, that the impeachment process is the only constitutionally valid means by which Congress may discipline federal judges, and thus that the 1980 legislation to
which he referred—which explicitly does not reach situations in which impeachment may be justified—is not an example of ‘delegated’ legislative power in the traditional sense. Rather, it represents
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other side of the coin—that is, for judicial independence—requires that accountability not entail influence that is deemed to be undue.
B. INTERBRANCH RELATIONS

Recent scholarship has also brought sharply into focus the fact that formal
protections of federal judicial independence pale in comparison with formal
powers that might be deployed to control the federal courts and make them
“accountable.” This scholarship, in particular the work of Charles Geyh,8 has
thus made it clear that the traditional equilibrium between the federal judiciary
and the other branches—what the organizers of this Conference have called
“our nation’s tradition of judicial independence”—owes its existence primarily
to informal norms and customs. One such norm or custom is to eschew use of
the impeachment process in response to judicial decisions that are unpopular.
Another is to eschew court packing as a means of ensuring decisions in accord
with the preferences of the dominant coalition.
However difficult it may be to amend constitutions, and however much we
may like to refer to a “constitutional law” of custom and practice, we know that
customs, norms, and traditions can change. Neither the fact that periods of
friction between the judiciary and the other branches have recurred throughout
our history nor the fact that they have been succeeded by a return to normalcy is
adequate grounds for confidence that the pattern will hold. Similarly, optimism
that norms of interdependence between the Executive and Legislative branches
can be restored provides little comfort. For, if I am correct about the dynamics
leading to our current malaise, there is reason to fear a tipping point, a point of
no return to the traditional equilibrium in interbranch relations affecting the
judiciary.
The current poisonous condition of interbranch relations affecting the judiciary is in one sense unremarkable. For that condition reflects the state of
contemporary politics in general, a defining characteristic of which has been a
breakdown of traditional norms of interdependence.9 It is, however, remarkably
dangerous for reasons that have to do not so much with the basic and enduring
fragility of judicial independence as with its vulnerability to another defining
characteristic of contemporary politics—namely, the debased notion of judicial
accountability implicit in a view of judges as policy agents: if judges are policy
agents, they should be “accountable” for their decisions in individual cases (or
at least those involving issues of high salience).
One need not (and I do not) believe that elected politicians seek to maximize
legislation necessary and proper to shore up and rationalize power that the institutional federal judiciary
previously exercised on its own without benefit of specific legislation.”).
8. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).
9. See generally Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages,
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 503 (2003).
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only their prospects for reelection to accept that, if those on the front lines of the
current war on courts (that is, some interest groups, politicians, and journalists)
succeeded in persuading the public to view judges as policy agents and courts as
part of ordinary politics, it might be impossible to return to the status quo ante.
For the informal norms and customs enabling the equilibrium we have enjoyed—a “tradition of judicial independence”—were forged and maintained in
the shadow of the public’s support of the courts, support that was offered even
in the face of unpopular decisions.
Richard Arnold was a distinguished appellate judge and master of federal
judicial administration in part because he was also a thoughtful student of
politics in general and of judicial politics. Judge Arnold did not write about
judicial independence often, but his extrajudicial writings are filled with expressions of concern about judicial accountability. That is not because he thought
that everyone understands what judicial independence is and accepts that,
defined as a judge might like to define it, it is an unalloyed good. He knew that
if the federal judiciary is in fact, or is perceived to be, insufficiently accountable, it will lose the independence necessary for it to accomplish, if not what the
architects of our system intended, what developing American constitutionalism
requires.
Judge Arnold often stated that the judiciary must have the “continuing
consent of the governed”10 in order to do its job. He also believed that, once a
court has observed all jurisdictional limitations on its power, it must render and
accept responsibility for a decision, however unpopular, that the law requires.
From this perspective, his repeated expressions of concern about judicial accountability represented underlying anxiety about the prospects of judicial independence—namely, the continuing willingness or ability of the courts not, as he put
it, to “pull [their] punches”11 when the law requires an unpopular decision.
Thus, I believe that Judge Arnold would have been relieved by the decisions
of the federal courts in the Schiavo litigation,12 whether or not he would have
agreed with those decisions on the merits. And to the doyen of direct mailing,
Richard Viguerie’s complaint that the decisions of those courts are “very
dramatic proof of what we have been saying: that the judiciary is out of
control,”13 I imagine Judge Arnold responding, “I certainly hope so.” I also
imagine him wondering how long that will be true.

10. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Judges and the Public, LITIG., Summer 1983, at 5, 5.
11. Id. at 59.
12. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla.), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1223
(11th Cir.), and reh’g denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 945, and stay denied, 544
U.S. 957 (2005).
13. See Carl Hulse & David B. Kirkpatrick, Casting Angry Eye on Courts: Conservatives Prime for
Bench-Clearing Brawl in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A15; see also Editorial, Listening to
Judge Lefkow, 88 JUDICATURE 240 (2005).
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C. LEGITIMACY: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS

We know that public support for the Supreme Court as an institution,
irrespective of the decisions it was rendering in the 1930s—what political
scientists call “diffuse support” and what I believe Judge Arnold was getting at
in referring to the “continuing consent of the governed”—was consequential in
the failure of President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.14 There is reason to
believe, however, that this deep well of diffuse support, which federal courts
have traditionally been able to draw upon when making unpopular decisions,15
might not survive the excrescences of contemporary politics regarding the
judiciary, were they to persist.
Research suggests that diffuse support is linked to legitimizing messages
about the courts, such as those that highlight the role of precedent and the
rule-of-law ideal,16 and that it is adversely affected by delegitimizing messages,
such as those that frame court decisions simply in terms of results (for example,
the message that Bush v. Gore decided the 2000 election).17 We also know that
most members of the public acquire whatever information they have about
courts from the mass media and that even the normally inattentive public may
pay attention to cases that are highly salient in personal terms (for example,
cases dealing with issues such as race or religion),18 receive extensive and
prolonged media coverage, or are perceived to have a direct relationship to an
individual’s “community.”19
Another body of research indicates that interest groups are here to stay in the
politics of judicial selection, federal and state; that they thrive on conflict as a
means to energize both their patrons and their members; and that they employ a
variety of tactics to convey their messages, from lobbying to direct communica-

14. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in
the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 67–74 (2002); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2611 (2003). On diffuse support, see DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF
POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965).
15. Substantial, albeit somewhat diminished, diffuse support for the Court persists notwithstanding
predictions to the contrary following Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Herbert M. Kritzer, The
American Public’s Assessment of the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 168, 172 (2005) (revealing that
support for the Court by Democrats and Independents did not change significantly after the Bush v.
Gore decision).
16. See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
343 (1998); see also James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of
2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 553–56 (2003) (discussing the
framing effect whereby unpopular decisions are cushioned by general views about the Court and the
rule of law).
17. See Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M. Howard, Framing Support for the Supreme Court in the
Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. POLITICS 676 (2003).
18. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
357, 362 (1968).
19. The concept of “community” may be relevant for these purposes in ideological as well as
geographical terms. See Valerie J. Hoeskstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 89, 97–98 (2000).
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tions with their members to indirect communications through the mass media.20
Although some groups pitch their messages concerning judicial selection in
terms of factors not directly related to results in cases (such as partisanship or
general ideology), others see advantage in framing choices precisely in terms of
the supposed effect of individual selection decisions on precedent concerning
highly salient issues (for example, the assertion that voting for this nominee will
lead to the overruling of Roe v. Wade).21
Given what we know about public knowledge of and attitudes toward courts
and about the incentives and tactics of the interest groups that are involved in
judicial selection, there is reason to fear that the distinction between support for
courts irrespective of the decisions they make (“diffuse support”) and support
depending on those decisions (“specific support”) will disappear. If that were to
occur, the people would ask of the judiciary not, “What does the law require?”
but rather, “What have you done for me lately?” At least in systems where they
lacked the ability to express their preferences directly (that is, by voting in an
election), they would expect elected officials to help them secure the desired
results by holding courts and judges “accountable” when they failed to produce
the desired results. Politicians whose strategies had encouraged viewing judges
as policy agents would have no incentive to resist.22 Those inclined to resist in
the public interest might find it very difficult to do so.
In such a system, law itself would be seen as nothing more than ordinary
politics, and it would become increasingly difficult to appoint (or elect or retain)
people with the qualities necessary for judicial independence, because the actors
involved would be preoccupied with a degraded notion of judicial accountability.23 At the end of the day, judicial independence would become a junior
partner to judicial accountability, or the partnership would be dissolved. The
imminence of the threat is suggested by a 2005 editorial in the Washington Post:
The war [over Justice O’Connor’s successor] is about money and fundraising
as much as it is about jurisprudence and the judicial function. It elevates
partisanship and political rhetoric over any serious discussion of law. In the
long run, the war over the courts—which teaches both judges and the public

20. See generally JACK L. WALKER JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1991); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., The Lobbying Activities of Organized
Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations, 62 J. POL. 51, 51–52 (2000).
21. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS 103
(2005); Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391, 1402
(2001).
22. Cf. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 328 (2005) (“Because
negative information, especially a steady flow of it, can decrease diffuse support, public support for the
judiciary is subject to manipulation.”).
23. See Susan S. Silbey, The Dream of a Social Science: Supreme Court Forecasting, Legal Culture,
and the Public Sphere, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 785, 789 (2004) (“Rather than better and worse craft, justices
will be assessed only by those who are for or against some position. If the decisions become understood
only as wins and losses, we feed the politicization and gaming of judicial appointments that have
become ever more systematic in an effort to predict, and control, the decisions of appointees.”).
SIONS, AND
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at large to view the courts simply as political institutions—threatens judicial
independence and the integrity of American justice.24

II. THE CONDUCT OF INTERBRANCH RELATIONS
The problem of interbranch relations concerning the federal judiciary is
hardly virgin territory. Robert Katzmann and Charles Geyh have asked and
provided thoughtful answers to most of the pertinent general questions concerning the nature, extent, and timing of communications that should occur between
the federal judiciary and Congress.25 Their work, together with that of Judith
Resnik,26 well sets the abiding dilemma confronting the federal judiciary of
participating in a political system without becoming the victim of politics. That
dilemma is acute today, and general prescriptions alone may not be sufficient
because so many people who are invested in politics evidently believe, with
Gore Vidal: “It is not enough to succeed. Others must fail.”27 More fundamentally, the agency theory of judicial accountability (that would hold judges
“accountable” as policy agents) underlying recent attacks on the courts is not
only irreconcilable with traditional notions of judicial independence; it is subversive of norms of respect and mutual accommodation that are essential to
productive interbranch relations.
A. NORMS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN INTERBRANCH RELATIONS

The dominant messages I draw from past work on interbranch relations are
that the modern federal judiciary should be (1) responsive to appropriate
requests for information from Congress; (2) prepared to offer the judiciary’s
views on proposed legislation (whether or not requested to do so), and even to
seek to initiate legislative action, in areas of legitimate institutional concern to
the judiciary; (3) generous in interpreting the universe of appropriate requests
for information from Congress; and (4) circumspect in defining areas of legitimate institutional concern to the judiciary. Katzmann’s work also highlights the
importance of not confining interbranch relations to formal communications,
whether they be written responses to requests for information or testimony
before congressional committees.28
Daniel Patrick Moynihan believed in what he called the “Iron Law of

24. Editorial, Not a Campaign, WASH. POST, July 5, 2005, at B6.
25. See generally JUDGES AND LEGISLATURES: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (Robert A. Katzmann
ed., 1988); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997); Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost,
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165
(1996).
26. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 225–27 (2003).
27. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 221 (Tony Auguard ed., 1991).
28. See KATZMANN, supra note 25, at 105–06 (exploring the ways in which a dialogue could emerge
between the judiciary and legislature in a section entitled “Promoting Ongoing Exchanges”).
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Emulation,”29 which holds that any time one branch of government develops a
technique that gives it an advantage over the other branches, the others will be
sure to adopt the same technique. Moynihan’s law probably best explains why,
at the very time (in the mid-1970s) that the House and Senate substantially
increased staff capacity,30 enabling them to monitor more effectively the decisions and rulemaking activities of the federal courts and the federal judiciary,
the federal judiciary instituted an Office of Legislative Affairs. The resources of
this office, together with others in the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (including particularly the Rules Support Office), well equip the judiciary to monitor proposed legislation affecting the judiciary.
In light of the formidable information base available through the Administrative Office and the Federal Judicial Center, and the formidable base of expertise
and insight available through the committees of the Judicial Conference, the
main challenges in this area of interbranch relations involve matters of judgment, timing, and tactics.
B. MATTERS OF JUDGMENT

Matters of judgment include when to resist a request for information as
inappropriate and how to define the areas that are deemed to be of legitimate
institutional concern to the judiciary. The boundaries of appropriate requests for
information are limned by a definition of federal judicial accountability that is
faithful to our history, including, in particular, the norms and customs that, with
the public’s support, have enabled our tradition of judicial independence. They
are exceeded by requests reflecting aberrant definitions such as that which in
recent years transformed oversight of the federal judiciary’s implementation of
the Sentencing Guidelines into oversight of an individual federal judge’s sentencing practices. It appears that the agency theory of judicial accountability caused
some members of the House to forget that, under the Constitution, congressional “oversight” (or, discipline) of an individual federal judge is appropriate
only in connection with a credible impeachment investigation.31 Requests for

29. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, COUNTING OUR BLESSINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICA
118 (1980).
30. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1677, 1726–28 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 339–41 (1991).
31. See Editorial, supra note 7. The same underlying cause may have prompted a remarkable letter
to the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from the Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, complaining about an allegedly “illegal” sentence that a panel of that court
let stand, and requesting a “prompt response with respect to what steps the Court of Appeals intends to
take to rectify the panel’s actions.” American Judicature Society, Judicial Independence: Article,
http://www.ajs.org/include/story.asp?content_id⫽418 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (quoting Rep. Sensebrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee). As I stated for the American Judicature Society:
AJS believes that the American people have a right to expect that the leaders of Congress will
not go off half-cocked in pursuit of a vision of “oversight” that is not only demonstrably
inconsistent with the constitutionally-prescribed separation of powers, but radically at odds
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information (or action) that evidently reflect a contrary view should be resisted.
If persuasion and compromise fail, the politics of power may require the
judiciary, an individual judge, or both to yield. Yet, even though legislative
foolishness or mischief must be abided (if it is not unconstitutional), the
foolishness or mischief should be made plain for all to see.
In defining areas of legitimate institutional concern to the judiciary—where it
should feel free to make comments and even to seek to initiate legislative
action—Judith Resnik’s work is particularly valuable. That work persuades me
that, even when asked to do so, the federal judiciary should resist becoming
embroiled in discussions and debates about proposed legislation that would
create new, or alter existing, substantive rights (such as by providing the
possibility for women who have been the victims of violence to sue for damages
in federal court).32 For, just as some legislators may be tempted to transform
oversight of the federal judiciary’s implementation of a law into oversight of an
individual judge, so may some judges be tempted to view a bill that would
increase the docket burdens of the federal courts through the prism of a general
theory of federalism. Institutional comments on such a bill from that perspective
would inevitably be viewed as taking sides on the merits, and they might be
invoked in legislative debates by those whose position they favored. Moreover,
the resentment harbored by legislators holding a different view on the merits—
and their cynicism about whose interests the judiciary’s representatives were
protecting—could only increase if, the legislation having been enacted, all or
part of it were declared unconstitutional.
Attention to the possibility that proposed legislation would add to the burdens
of the judiciary, when some courts are already overtaxed, suggests a partial
exemption from this prophylactic norm. On the assumption that the federal
judiciary can provide reliable estimates of the workload and other resource
implications of proposed legislation,33 such information is obviously germane
to legislative deliberations. A history of unreliable estimates would, however,
create suspicion either of incompetence or of concealed policy preferences on
the merits—neither of which would well serve the interests of productive
interbranch relations.
The suggested norm against comment by the judiciary concerns proposed
legislation that would create new, or alter existing, substantive rights. By
definition, it would seem not to apply to proposed legislation on matters of

with historical practice . . . . Chairman Sensenbrenner is a bull in a china shop who cannot
distinguish between “oversight” of individual federal judges and individual cases while they
are pending, both of which are wholly inappropriate unless perhaps as part of an impeachment
investigation, and oversight of the federal judiciary as a whole, which is certainly an
appropriate and important duty of Congress.
Id.
32. See Resnik, supra note 26, at 294.
33. But see id. at 286, 289, 296 (revealing that the judiciary has difficulty in providing accurate
predictions of future workload).
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practice and procedure governing the conduct of litigation in the federal courts.
Indeed, with the exception of criminal sentencing matters, it is likely that the
greatest volume of communications between the federal judiciary and Congress,
formal and informal, in recent decades has concerned proposed legislation that
would block proposed amendments to, or would directly amend, the rules of
procedure that the Supreme Court promulgates under the Rules Enabling Act.34
Such communications are usually not problematic. As I have developed in other
work, however, the judiciary should reconsider its practice of objecting to
provisions in proposed legislation that contain discrete (non-uniform) procedural rules designed to accommodate legislative policy with respect to a particular substantive law scheme.35
C. MATTERS OF TIMING AND TACTICS

Matters of timing and tactics include how to proceed in seeking legislation
favorable to the judiciary and how to negotiate over the content of legislation
that is of legitimate institutional concern to the judiciary. As to the former, the
judiciary would be well-advised to follow the Golden Rule. Having (justly)
complained about instances in which legislation affecting the judiciary was
enacted without prior notice or consultation—as, for example, when included at
the last minute in an appropriations bill—it ill behooves that institution to game
the system in the same way because the potential fruits are sweet rather than
bitter.36 As to the latter, one who enters into negotiations should be aware of any
norms peculiar to the institutional context, as well as of general norms and
assumptions governing negotiating behavior.
A norm peculiar (albeit by no means unique) to the context of congressional
negotiations is that of “logrolling.” As David Law has observed, “[f]or senators,
logrolling goes unremarked as collegiality or business as usual.”37 The horsetrading and compromises that are part and parcel of the legislative process may
34. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074
(2000)). Under this statute, rules promulgated by the Supreme Court that are reported to Congress by
May 1 become effective on December 1 if legislation to the contrary is not enacted. 28 U.S.C. § 2074.
35. Given widespread knowledge today that many so-called procedural rules have substantial effects
on substantive rights—the modern class action rule, dating to 1966, being perhaps the most prominent
example—the invocation of “The Enabling Act Process” as an objection to a rule that could not be
promulgated pursuant to that process (because, being substance-specific, it would not be a “general
rule” authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)), may appear to be an attempt by
the judiciary to reestablish monopoly power over “procedure” as a means to bury substantive policy
choices. If inconsistently voiced, “The Enabling Act Process” objection may also be thought a mask for
disagreement on the merits. See Burbank, supra note 30, at 1729–33, 1737–39; Joseph A. Grundfest &
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002).
36. See Edward R. Becker, Of Laws and Sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7, 8 (2003).
37. David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 510 (2005). Professor Scherer attributes the reluctance of Presidents “to enter into judicial log-rolls” to the fact that “key party and issue activists today place
ideological purity over political compromise.” NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS,
AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 152–53 (2005).
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not be congenial to members of the judiciary. More realistically, participation in
a quasi-public process involving such tradeoffs may not be congenial. For,
although informed observers know that judges on plural courts engage in a
similar process when negotiating an opinion for a court or panel,38 doing so
may be thought inconsistent with the traditional vision of law as a determinate
body of rules that judges find and apply. To the extent that the position of the
federal courts “depend[s] on preserving [their] difference from the other branches
of government,”39 judges negotiating on behalf of the judiciary may fear that by
performing such a non-judicial function, they put that position at risk among
members of Congress and members of the public who may not distinguish
between the judicial and non-judicial activities of Article III judges.
A general norm of negotiations is that a negotiating party does not like to
negotiate against himself—to have reached what appeared to be a deal, only to
be told that the person negotiating on the other side lacked final authority. The
institutional federal judiciary is a latter-day hierarchy imposed on what had
been a highly decentralized collection of largely autonomous actors. When
speaking as an interest group, which is how it may appear to be speaking in
most of its dealings with Congress, the federal judiciary attempts to speak with
one voice. Even though it is not possible to prevent individual federal judges
from disagreeing, there is no excuse for the institutional judiciary itself to
change voices late in the process.40
D. THE JUDICIARY AS AN INTEREST GROUP

The perception that the institutional judiciary is an interest group when
seeking, or seeking to avert, legislative action is, of course, another way of
framing the abiding dilemma confronting the federal judiciary of participating
in a political system without becoming the victim of politics. Viewed as just
another interest group, the federal judiciary has no special reason to complain
when Congress enacts legislation affecting the institution without prior notice or
an opportunity to comment at hearings, and in violation of its own rules. It
similarly has no special reason to complain, viewed as such, when a legislative
provision affecting the judiciary is secured, without prior consultation, through
the efforts of the Executive branch. From this perspective, the challenge for the
federal judiciary is to avoid the perception that it is “just another interest
38. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 280–90.
39. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 20 (4th rev. ed. 2005). Professor
McCloskey was commenting here on the Court’s “shrewd insight” in refusing “to perform ‘nonjudicial’ functions,” to wit, “that the Court’s position would ultimately depend on preserving its
difference from the other branches of government.” Id.
40. This is one view of the process that led to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2000)). See Stephen B.
Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 232
(1997) (describing how the federal judiciary designated a task force of judges to work with the Senate
Judiciary Committee on revising the Civil Justice Reform Act but later “publicly expressed continuing
opposition”).
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group”—that its politics are ordinary politics.
One way of doing that is to avoid the tactics of interest groups preoccupied
with victory and, as a result, willing to initiate, or at least to go along with,
irregularities of the legislative process to which they would object if the shoe
were on the other foot—hence, my invocation of the Golden Rule in discussing
timing and tactics for seeking legislation favorable to the judiciary. More
generally, the leaders of the federal judiciary should give sustained thought to
the question of the forms and methods of politics that are consistent with the
judiciary’s historic roles and functions and with its status as a co-equal branch
of the federal government. In doing so, they will find it helpful to distinguish
between the political arts of Richard Arnold and those of Tom DeLay.
III. THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Robert Katzmann’s prescription for better interbranch relations evidently
reflects the insight that good institutional relations are more likely to result from
good interpersonal relations and that good interpersonal relations are built on
dialogue and trust.41 Yet, the insight suggests why the challenges of contemporary interbranch relations affecting the federal judiciary are so daunting. For
where in contemporary politics is the evidence of dialogue and trust, let alone of
other hallmarks of good interpersonal relations, such as patience and compromise? Moreover, in the current climate is there not a heightened risk that, by
seeking greater communication with elected politicians and their agents, members of the federal judiciary will foster the notion of judicial accountability that
treats judges themselves as policy agents and courts as part of ordinary politics?
The federal judiciary is not the only victim of contemporary politics, and the
risk I posit is different merely in degree, not in kind, from that which for so
many years kept the federal judiciary at arm’s length from the other branches.
A.

“JUST POLITICIANS”?

Judge Arnold was candid about, and humorous in describing, the politics of
his appointment to the federal bench.42 He was also characteristically modest in
attributing his appointment and lengthy tenure as Chair of the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States to his pre-judicial service as
legislative assistant to Senator Dale Bumpers, a member of the Appropriations
Subcommittee for the judiciary.43 Judge Arnold enjoyed his service as Chair of
the Budget Committee, he said, because “[i]t has a little touch of politics about
it . . . and I have always enjoyed politics.”44 He also observed that “[p]olitics is

41. See supra text accompanying note 28.
42. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 SMU L. REV. 767,
767–68 (2003); id. at 768 (“So I got confirmed in the elevator.”).
43. Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the Other Two Branches,
Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 22 (1996).
44. Obituary, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 25, 2004, at 8B.
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people, . . . and it should be and can be an honorable profession.”45 On another
occasion, however, noting that “many members of the public seem to feel that
judges are just politicians in another guise,” Judge Arnold concluded that
“[s]ometimes some of us are, but we should not be.”46
These views are not inconsistent. Judge Arnold, although a judge while acting
as Chair of the Budget Committee, was not acting as part of a court exercising
judicial power. Moreover, he could and likely would have distinguished between a federal judge and an elected politician with words similar to those he
used to describe why the federal judiciary is not usually uppermost in the minds
of members of Congress—“we lack a particular constituency.”47 In any event,
that Judge Arnold disapproved of deeming federal judges “just politicians”
hardly suggests that he intended the bright line between law and politics that the
distinction might suggest.
I believe that Judge Arnold would have recognized that the more indeterminate law is, and therefore the more room there is for the play of policy and
preference, the more legitimate—and the more important—it is for a court of
last resort also to take account of considerations that bear on the perceived
legitimacy and continuing effectiveness of the judiciary as a whole. If so, he
would have distinguished between (1) a situation in which, responding to
popular sentiment at the time, a court evaded a result that either clear (and
clearly controlling) precedent or the unmistakable tenor of positive law required, and (2) a situation in which (precedent or positive law not unmistakably
dictating the result) the court considered the implications of alternative decisions for the continuing ability of courts not to “pull their punches” in other
cases—namely those in which the law as generally understood leaves no room
for equivocation.
In the first situation, the court would be engaged in a political act difficult to
distinguish from the behavior of an elected politician responding to a constituency. In the second, the behavior would be “political” only in the sense that
statesmanship, deference, and compromise in a world of disputable premises
and conclusions are part of the art of governance. Put another way, like
separation of powers, to which it is instrumental, judicial independence should
be seen as “an architecture that has structural integrity but can nevertheless
adapt spaces and functions to meet changing needs.”48
Judge Arnold understood that courts are involved in politics, and, far from
regretting that fact, he rejoiced in it. He once observed that
the courts, like the rest of the government, depend on the consent of the
governed. And we judges are, in a sense, political. I have sometimes described
45. Id.
46. Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 MO. L. REV. 533, 545 (1995).
47. Arnold, supra note 43, at 25.
48. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990).
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myself as a professional politician, because I think that the courts are, in the
finest and broadest sense of the word, a political institution. We function not
on paper or in the abstract, but as part of a real, living system of government,
each part of which has its own role to play.49

For Richard Arnold, the notion—fashionable twenty years ago and in radically
different (or different radical) circles today—that law is nothing more than
politics was not a cause of despair because, for him, law was equally nothing
less than politics: specifically, the art of seeking to improve the human condition
through intelligence, patience, persuasion, and compromise.
B. THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION

What I have called the agency theory of judicial accountability is most
vividly demonstrated at the federal level in the appointment strategies of
Presidents who follow what Sheldon Goldman calls a policy agenda—as opposed to a personal or partisan agenda—in making judicial nominations.50
Presidents following a policy agenda seek to fill judicial vacancies with individuals they believe will reliably decide cases in accordance with their preferred
policies. Moreover, whether because they fear the power of the rule-of-law ideal
or the phenomenon my colleague Ted Ruger calls “judicial preference change,”51
some Presidents seek protection against changes of mind or heart by nominating
individuals with preferences seen to be hard-wired. Finally in this aspect, there
is ample and persuasive evidence from both Supreme Court and lower federal
court appointment experience that presidential pursuit of a policy agenda in
making judicial nominations (and the reaction to it by Senators of the opposition party) is the chief cause of the politicization of judicial selection at the
federal level.52
Selecting strong ideologues with hard-wired preferences is not the only
means of seeking judicial policy agents. If a judicial aspirant is not adequately
equipped to be a reliable policy agent by background, education, or experience,
perhaps he or she can be induced nonetheless to commit to a desired path of

49. Richard Arnold, Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, Address, in SYMPOSIUM
12 (Patricia A. Eables & John P. Gill eds., 1989).
50. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN 3–4 (1997) (distinguishing a policy agenda from a partisan or personal agenda);
Carolyn Dineen King, Current Challenges to the Federal Judiciary, 66 LA. L. REV. 661, 667 (2006)
(“What this selection process conveys to the public is the notion that the Judiciary is yet another
political branch of the government, a kind of stepchild of the other two branches.”).
51. See Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference
Change, 70 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1210, 1217–19 (2005).
52. See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 2, at 1535–36 (“Both the relatively
noncontroversial confirmations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and a comparison of lower court
nominations that generated controversy with those that did not suggest much more likely causal
influences [than lengthening tenures]: the increasingly common practice of presidents to pursue what
Sheldon Goldman calls a policy agenda in making nominations to all federal appellate courts and the
Senate’s reaction to those nominated pursuant to such an agenda.”).
ON THE JUDICIARY
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judicial decision in advance.53 Thus, the First Amendment—the same First
Amendment that was invoked to protect Nazis marching in Skokie—has been
enlisted in an effort to assimilate judicial elections to the elections of ordinary
politics. Thus, judicial independence has been sacrificed at the altar of a
degraded notion of judicial accountability. The Supreme Court’s opinion in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,54 and in particular its treatment of the
concept of judicial impartiality, has paved the way for a self-fulfilling prophecy.
If such prophecies are to be confounded rather than fulfilled, and if we are
therefore to have judges who are free of policy commitments other than a
commitment to the rule of law,55 we shall need to rescue both judicial accountability and politics itself from their current degraded states. Today’s complex
legal landscape cries out for judges who renounce the partisan and who are not
slaves either to a belief system or to an identifiable constituency. It also cries out
for humility, by which I mean recognition, in Judge Arnold’s words, that
“holding . . . a commission signed by the president does not in and of itself
confer moral superiority.”56
CONCLUSION
In the current political climate, there is reason for concern about adherence to
long-standing customs or norms and hence about resort to blunt instruments of
influence or control by members of Congress determined to work their will on
the federal courts and to “take no prisoners” in the process.57 The same is true
53. Similar motivations may animate campaign contributions to candidates in states that elect
judges. Whether or not such contributions in fact affect results in cases important to contributors,
“[m]any judges concede that sitting on their contributors’ cases creates the perception that their votes
can be bought.” Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, § 1, at 1. That perception among members of the public is potentially fatal to the
rule of law. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
54. 536 U.S. 765, 775–78 (2002) (holding that a Minnesota “announce clause,” which prohibited
judicial candidates from announcing their personal views on disputed issues likely to come before the
judge (if elected), violated the First Amendment).
55. I draw a distinction between ideology in the weak sense of the preferences as to political, social,
and economic arrangements that all sentient adults, and hence all judges, have and that inevitably affect
decisions in which there is an element of discretion, on the one hand, and ideology in the strong sense
of preferences that hold sway with such power as to be impervious to adjudicative facts, competing
policies, or the governing law as it is generally understood, on the other. Ideology in this second sense
is revealed as the enemy of judicial independence. It is in that regard no different from non-ideological
pre-commitment to certain legal positions for the purpose of securing or retaining a judicial position.
56. Arnold, supra note 10, at 5.
57. This was Tom DeLay’s admiring assessment of the approach of the so-called House Working
Group on Judicial Accountability. See Editorial, Rehnquist to DeLay: Bug Off on Judges, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS, Jan. 12, 2004, at 6B. In correspondence with Todd Metcalf, a legislative assistant to
Representative Max Sandlin, who sought my views on certain questions raised by the reported plans of
this group, I observed:
Representative Sandlin would know better than I whether a self-appointed group of members
of the House from one side of the aisle has standing or power to do anything, other than
further pollute discourse that is already debased. I would have thought not. The risk, however,
is precisely that, by adding to a legislative corpus of misinformation and inter-branch hostility
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in a number of states. The proper response is not—it cannot be—assertions of
power that does not exist. The federal judiciary not only lacks a purse and a
sword; its shield is very narrow. The same is true of state judiciaries. Wiser
heads must prevail, and, if necessary, informed public opinion must be brought
to bear on those who are ignorant of, or choose not to heed, the lessons of our
constitutional history.
The judiciary needs more judges who are politicians in the sense that Richard
Arnold was a politician. These are judges for whom people are more important
than abstractions, for whom dialogue and deference—involving litigants, other
courts, and the other institutions of government—are a two-way street, and for
whom reasonable processes and institutions of accountability are viewed not as
obstructions but, like the law itself, as “those wise restraints that make us
free.”58 Such people need not have a background in politics. Indeed, although
the example of Judge Arnold suggests that political experience can be helpful,
one can easily imagine a different kind of politics—whether one infected with
ideology of the strong sort or with relentless partisanship—that would be a
handicap.
The notion that the judiciary might take the lead in reestablishing such a
politics—of custom, dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship—will come as a
shock only to those who believe that politics and law, like judicial independence
and accountability, are irreconcilable, or those whose exposure to politically
feckless judges has caused them to forget those who are adepts.59
that is already too large, the House Working Group will influence those who do have power. In
that regard, the quoted characterization of the group’s “take no prisoners” approach, however
praiseworthy in the pursuit of termites, manifests a woefully ignorant and inappropriate
attitude towards an institution for the establishment of which our ancestors fought and died
and which has been a cornerstone of our freedoms.
E-mail from Stephen B. Burbank to Todd Metcalf (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
58. This language is part of the citation read by the President of Harvard University in conferring the
J.D. degree at commencement. See Marvin Hightower, The Spirit and Spectacle of Harvard Commencement, http://www.commencement.harvard.edu/background/spirit.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
59. For evidence that the federal judiciary is capable of marrying good politics to good policy in
response to intemperate (but not wholly unjustified) congressional criticism, see generally THE JUDICIAL
CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY
ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (Sept. 2006). A recent editorial described the report as
follows:
Far from hiding the federal judiciary’s dirty linen in the closet, the report thoroughly discusses
situations in which the judiciary’s performance was deficient, as it does the causes that may be
responsible. Its numerous recommendations, if implemented, should measurably reduce instances in which the judiciary fails to police itself as envisioned in the 1980 Act. Many of
these recommendations focus on the importance of providing timely and accurate information
about the Act to those responsible for administering it, to potential complainants, and to
legislators, the press, and the public. Moreover, one cause of problems in “high-visibility”
dispositions was the failure to appreciate the need to resolve public, non-frivolous allegations
publicly. The report’s embrace of appropriate judicial accountability, of the role that public
perception plays in maintaining the traditional equilibrium between independence and accountability, and of a candid yet sensitive, and above all non-defensive, approach to judicial
self-regulation, is one of its most important contributions.
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Richard Arnold was an adept at the politics of judging and the politics of the
judiciary, and it would help if other judges followed his example. It would thus
help if fewer federal judges were inclined to “[p]osterity-worship”60 and institutional aggrandizement.61 For, if judges forget that their independence exists for
the benefit of the judiciary as a whole—and ultimately, of course, for the benefit
of our system of government—they may discover that, in the world of power
politics, the reality of judicial independence does not match the rhetoric.

Editorial, Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 52, 53, 92 (2006).
60. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 287–88 (1949) (“‘No
doubt it expands the ego of a judge to look upon himself as the guardian of the general future. But his
more humble yet more important and immediate task is to decide individual, actual, present cases
. . . . Such judicial legislation as inheres in formulating legal rules is inescapable. But courts should be
modest in their legislative efforts to control the future . . . . The future can become as perniciously
tyrannical as the past. Posterity-worship can be as bad as ancestor-worship.’”(quoting Aero Spark Plug
Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring))).
61. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) (noting that Boerne represents a “startlingly strong view of
judicial supremacy”); Shane, supra note 9, at 510 (noting that of “151 federal statutes declared
unconstitutional in whole or part by the Court between 1789 and June 2000, 40—over 26%—were
declared unconstitutional since 1981”); see also Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political
Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13 (2006) (“In short, would we not be better served by greater judicial
modesty?”).

